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munity, or rights and responsibilities with regard to the group and authority, including 
loyalty, conformity to norms, obedience and protection; (2) Autonomy, including rights 
and responsibilities of the individual with regard to harm and fairness; and (3) Divinity, 
including considerations of wholeness, purity, sanctity and defilement.  This approach 
further posits that each of these codes entails a different emotion when violations are 
observed – contempt, anger and disgust, respectively.  The three moral codes and their 
accompanying other-blaming emotions are labeled the “CAD triad” (Rozin, Lowery, 
Imada, & Haidt, 1999).
The moral concerns of the four relational models can be seen to parallel (or possibly 
give rise to) those of the CAD triad (Sunar, 2009).  Briefly, Community concerns are 
similar to those of AR; Autonomy concerns are parallel to those of EM and MP; and 
Divinity concerns are parallel to those of CS.   
These relatively recent approaches that see morality and moral emotions as having 
their origin in social relations stand in contrast to the more individual-based approach, 
which focuses on “self-conscious” or self-blaming emotions, namely shame and guilt 
(e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
The present paper proposes that these two sets of emotions, the self-blaming and 
other-blaming moral emotions, are in complementary relationship with one another, 
and that each pair of them tends to be experienced in specifiable relational contexts, one 
member of the pair being felt by the moral transgressor and the other by the blaming 
observer (real or imagined).  (See also Rudolph, & Tscharaktschiew, 2014, for a discus-
sion of targets of moral emotions.)
Violations and emotional responses
What counts as a moral infraction in the different relational models (and moral 
codes) varies from one model to the other (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Rozin et al. 1999; Sunar, 
2009).  Accordingly, we expect emotional responses to vary along with the nature of the 
infraction (Laham, Chopra, Lalljee & Parkinson, 2010; Sunar 2009).  
In a communal sharing relation, governed by the code of divinity, moral violations 
include ignoring the needs of members of the communal group or dyad or violating 
boundaries, taboos or rules.  The person who violates the code is expected to fear or 
experience rejection or exclusion – feeling shame as impurity and unworthiness – and 
victims or observers are expected to feel disgust, which in its physical form motivates 
extrusion of an offending substance and in its metaphorical social extension motivates 
exclusion of the human offender.   
In an authority ranking relation, governed by the community ethic, infractions in-
clude actions such as disobedience or disloyalty by subordinates, failure by superiors to 
protect subordinates, overstepping boundaries of rank, or flouting authority and tradi-
tion.  The person who violates the code is expected to fear or experience loss of status 
or reputation – feeling shame – and victims or observers are expected to feel contempt, 
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Abstract
The present paper reports results of empirical investigation for a model that posits a complementary relation-
ship between self-blaming and other-blaming emotions and suggests that distinctive relationships between them 
depend on the relational context and associated moral codes.  Relevant findings of two studies in Turkish cul-
ture that examined different aspects of the model are presented. The first study provided partial support for the 
relationship between shame- and guilt-proneness and relational model preferences. The findings of the second 
study revealed strong support for the complementary relationship (1) between shame related to rejection or ex-
clusion and disgust in contexts that represented the communal sharing relational model / divinity moral code; (2) 
between shame related to status loss and contempt in contexts that represented the authority ranking relational 
model / community moral code and (3) between guilt and anger in contexts representing equality matching or 
market pricing relational model / autonomy moral codes.  Overall, these findings in Turkish culture provided ini-
tial empirical evidence for the connections between moral emotions, moral codes and relational models. 
Introduction
Relational models theory (Fiske, 1992; 2004) posits four basic models for human re-
lationships (communal sharing - CS, authority ranking - AR, equality matching - EM 
and market pricing - MP) and further argues that morality consists of relationship reg-
ulation (Rai & Fiske, 2011).  Accordingly, in each of these models, moral action serves 
to establish or restore unity, hierarchy, equality, or proportionality, respectively.  From 
this point of view, each relational model makes its own unique moral demands, such 
that an action which might be seen as morally appropriate in one model may be per-
ceived as entirely inappropriate in another.  For example, favoring kin may be seen as 
morally correct in communal sharing relations, while the same behavior may be seen as 
morally-condemned corruption in market pricing relations.  In line with Fiske’s (2002) 
general assertion that each relational model entails distinctive emotions, each model may 
also be seen as eliciting specific moral emotions.
Shweder and colleagues (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) similarly ar-
gue that morality is not unitary but rather consists of three “ethics” or codes: (1) Com-
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fined above, in common usage little distinction is made between shame (utanç) and guilt 
(suçluluk), with considerably more frequent use of shame-related words than guilt-re-
lated words.  Being carried out with Turkish-speaking respondents, the studies reported 
here placed somewhat more emphasis on shame.
 The first study investigated the relationship between shame and guilt as self-blam-
ing emotions and their relationship with relational models and attachment style (Tokuş, 
2014).  From this study, only the data regarding the relationship between self-blaming 
emotions and relational models are presented here.  The second study focused more di-
rectly on shame, as well as investigating other accompanying emotions, and the emo-
tions expected of others in specific shame-arousing social situations (Çağın, 2014).
Study 1
Hypothesis:  Frequency of reported experience of both shame and guilt will vary ac-
cording to the individual’s preference of relational model.
Method
Participants. 386 respondents (79 male), age 18-30, completed the measures.
Instruments. Preference for relational models was measured by the Modes of Rela-
tionship Questionnaire (MORQ; Haslam & Fiske, 1999).  Frequency of experiencing 
feelings of shame and guilt was assessed using the Personal Feeling Questionnaire-2 
(PFQ-2; Harder & Zalma, 1990).  Both the PFQ-2 and the MORQ were translated into 
Turkish using standard translation-back translation procedures and corrected in the light 
of feedback in a pilot application.  
Procedure. The instruments were administered either in printed form or as an on-
line survey and typically took less than 30 minutes to complete.  For further details see 
Tokuş (2014).
Results
Two analyses were carried out to test the prediction that different relational models 
would be associated with different tendencies to shame and guilt.  First, Pearson cor-
relations between MORQ scores and PFQ-2 scores were calculated.  The results can be 
seen in Table 2.  Degree of preference for AR, EM, and MP is significantly positively 
correlated with shame-proneness, and degree of preference for AR and MP is also sig-
nificantly positively related to guilt-proneness.  However, degree of preference for CS 
was not related to either shame or guilt proneness.  
Multiple regression analyses were also carried out, with the four relational models as 
predictors of (1) the PFQ-2 shame score, and (2) the PFQ-2 guilt score. Shame scores 
were significantly and positively predicted by EM (beta = .09, t = 2.02, p = .04) and MP 
(beta = .15, t = 2.96, p = .003) scores, but negatively predicted by CS scores (beta =.11, 
t = 2.16, p = .03).  Guilt scores were significantly predicted only by MP scores (beta = 
.13, t = 2.46, p = .01).  Although both regressions were significant, very little of the vari-
“looking down” on the one who has fallen.
In an equality matching relation, governed by the autonomy ethic, violations include 
undeserved harm, failure of reciprocity, and other types of cheating.  In a market pric-
ing relation, also governed by the autonomy ethic, infractions consist mainly of viola-
tions of equity (proportionality of outcomes to inputs).  In both of these relational mod-
els and the ethic of autonomy, the violator is expected to feel guilt and a desire to make 
up for the misdeed and the harm caused to the other, while victims or observers are ex-
pected to feel anger and a desire to punish or exact revenge. 
To sum up, the proposed reciprocal or complementary self-blaming and other-blam-
ing emotion pairs are as follows: (1) shame of exclusion – disgust; (2) shame of status 
loss – contempt; (3) guilt – anger. These relationships are illustrated in Table 1 (see also 
Sunar, 2009).
Table 1
Complementary moral emotions
Relational Model/ 
Moral Code Other-blaming Emotion Self-blaming Emotion
CS1 / Divinity Disgust Shame (of exclusion)
AR2 / Community Contempt Shame (of status loss)
EM3 + MP4 / Auto-
nomy Anger Guilt
1 Communal Sharing; 2 Authority Ranking; 3 Equality Matching; 4 Market Pricing
While some aspects of the CAD triad hypothesis have received a great deal of at-
tention, notably the association of the emotion of disgust with the moral code of divin-
ity (for a partial review see Russell, & Giner-Sorolla, 2013), the full model has been 
little investigated.  And, although the original study carried out by Rozin et al. (1999) 
was based on cross-cultural data, few studies have followed their example, with the ex-
ception of some of those focusing on disgust. One important exception to these gen-
eralizations, and one which lends support to the model suggested here, is the study by 
Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa (2011) carried out with samples from both UK and Spain, 
which found that exposure to angry faces was more likely to elicit guilt rather than 
shame, while disgusted expressions were more likely to elicit shame rather than guilt.  It 
was also found in this study that angry expressions were more likely to be expected in 
situations involving harm-doing or rights violations than in violations involving body-re-
lated norms.
In a first attempt to bring the CAD triad hypothesis into juxtaposition with relational 
models theory, two studies were carried out in Turkey to investigate different aspects of 
the proposed relations.  Although there are rather clear definitions of the emotion terms 
in English, there are some difficulties in achieving the same clarity in Turkish.  Although 
there are specific Turkish terms that correspond with each of the English terms de-
Sunar - 417
fined above, in common usage little distinction is made between shame (utanç) and guilt 
(suçluluk), with considerably more frequent use of shame-related words than guilt-re-
lated words.  Being carried out with Turkish-speaking respondents, the studies reported 
here placed somewhat more emphasis on shame.
 The first study investigated the relationship between shame and guilt as self-blam-
ing emotions and their relationship with relational models and attachment style (Tokuş, 
2014).  From this study, only the data regarding the relationship between self-blaming 
emotions and relational models are presented here.  The second study focused more di-
rectly on shame, as well as investigating other accompanying emotions, and the emo-
tions expected of others in specific shame-arousing social situations (Çağın, 2014).
Study 1
Hypothesis:  Frequency of reported experience of both shame and guilt will vary ac-
cording to the individual’s preference of relational model.
Method
Participants. 386 respondents (79 male), age 18-30, completed the measures.
Instruments. Preference for relational models was measured by the Modes of Rela-
tionship Questionnaire (MORQ; Haslam & Fiske, 1999).  Frequency of experiencing 
feelings of shame and guilt was assessed using the Personal Feeling Questionnaire-2 
(PFQ-2; Harder & Zalma, 1990).  Both the PFQ-2 and the MORQ were translated into 
Turkish using standard translation-back translation procedures and corrected in the light 
of feedback in a pilot application.  
Procedure. The instruments were administered either in printed form or as an on-
line survey and typically took less than 30 minutes to complete.  For further details see 
Tokuş (2014).
Results
Two analyses were carried out to test the prediction that different relational models 
would be associated with different tendencies to shame and guilt.  First, Pearson cor-
relations between MORQ scores and PFQ-2 scores were calculated.  The results can be 
seen in Table 2.  Degree of preference for AR, EM, and MP is significantly positively 
correlated with shame-proneness, and degree of preference for AR and MP is also sig-
nificantly positively related to guilt-proneness.  However, degree of preference for CS 
was not related to either shame or guilt proneness.  
Multiple regression analyses were also carried out, with the four relational models as 
predictors of (1) the PFQ-2 shame score, and (2) the PFQ-2 guilt score. Shame scores 
were significantly and positively predicted by EM (beta = .09, t = 2.02, p = .04) and MP 
(beta = .15, t = 2.96, p = .003) scores, but negatively predicted by CS scores (beta =.11, 
t = 2.16, p = .03).  Guilt scores were significantly predicted only by MP scores (beta = 
.13, t = 2.46, p = .01).  Although both regressions were significant, very little of the vari-
“looking down” on the one who has fallen.
In an equality matching relation, governed by the autonomy ethic, violations include 
undeserved harm, failure of reciprocity, and other types of cheating.  In a market pric-
ing relation, also governed by the autonomy ethic, infractions consist mainly of viola-
tions of equity (proportionality of outcomes to inputs).  In both of these relational mod-
els and the ethic of autonomy, the violator is expected to feel guilt and a desire to make 
up for the misdeed and the harm caused to the other, while victims or observers are ex-
pected to feel anger and a desire to punish or exact revenge. 
To sum up, the proposed reciprocal or complementary self-blaming and other-blam-
ing emotion pairs are as follows: (1) shame of exclusion – disgust; (2) shame of status 
loss – contempt; (3) guilt – anger. These relationships are illustrated in Table 1 (see also 
Sunar, 2009).
Table 1
Complementary moral emotions
Relational Model/ 
Moral Code Other-blaming Emotion Self-blaming Emotion
CS1 / Divinity Disgust Shame (of exclusion)
AR2 / Community Contempt Shame (of status loss)
EM3 + MP4 / Auto-
nomy Anger Guilt
1 Communal Sharing; 2 Authority Ranking; 3 Equality Matching; 4 Market Pricing
While some aspects of the CAD triad hypothesis have received a great deal of at-
tention, notably the association of the emotion of disgust with the moral code of divin-
ity (for a partial review see Russell, & Giner-Sorolla, 2013), the full model has been 
little investigated.  And, although the original study carried out by Rozin et al. (1999) 
was based on cross-cultural data, few studies have followed their example, with the ex-
ception of some of those focusing on disgust. One important exception to these gen-
eralizations, and one which lends support to the model suggested here, is the study by 
Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa (2011) carried out with samples from both UK and Spain, 
which found that exposure to angry faces was more likely to elicit guilt rather than 
shame, while disgusted expressions were more likely to elicit shame rather than guilt.  It 
was also found in this study that angry expressions were more likely to be expected in 
situations involving harm-doing or rights violations than in violations involving body-re-
lated norms.
In a first attempt to bring the CAD triad hypothesis into juxtaposition with relational 
models theory, two studies were carried out in Turkey to investigate different aspects of 
the proposed relations.  Although there are rather clear definitions of the emotion terms 
in English, there are some difficulties in achieving the same clarity in Turkish.  Although 
there are specific Turkish terms that correspond with each of the English terms de-
Sunar - 418
these situations and they also rated 12 other self-related emotions and 12 emotions that 
might be felt by an observing other, all on a scale from 0 to 4. The observer was speci-
fied by the respondent.  For more details see Çağın (2014).
Each of the situations was assumed to fit into a particular relational model and moral 
code.  CS/Divinity was represented by the sexuality items (7 and 8); AR/Community by 
the academic failure and embarrassing public situation items (1, 5 and 6); and EM+MP/
Autonomy by the items covering neglect of responsibility, lying, and harm (2, 3, 4).
Procedure. The Shame Measure and the other instruments used in the larger study 
were administered in random order in two sessions separated by a one-week interval; 
sessions were conducted in groups of 15 or fewer respondents and lasted for about 30 
minutes.
Results
Hierarchical cluster analysis revealed that the 8 vignettes could be grouped into 5 
clusters:  (1) “moral transgressions” (lying, harm-doing, irresponsible behavior); (2) em-
barrassing public situations (falling down, insufficient funds); (3) academic failure; (4) 
exposed body (for females; for males this was included in the embarrassing public situ-
ations cluster); and (5) exposure to sexual stimuli in the presence of others (see Çağın, 
2014 for details).  
Multiple regression analysis was conducted on shame scores for each of these clus-
ters to determine the predictor variables among both the self-oriented and the other-ori-
ented reactions. Table 3 shows the significant predictors for each of the clusters that can 
be considered as moral emotions.  Some other emotions, such as affectionate, anxious, 
disappointed, sad, or tense also emerged as predictors in some of the situations, but only 
the moral emotion terms or their synonyms are shown in the table. However, “not affec-
tionate” is shown, as it supports the idea that rejection anxiety is involved in some of the 
vignettes.
ance was explained (shame R2 = .06; guilt R2 = .02).
Table 2
Correlations between relational model preference and frequency of shame and guilt feelings
Communal  
Sharing
Authority     
Ranking
Equality 
Matching
Market           
Pricing
Shame -.07 .16** .15** .25**
Guilt .03 .12* .07 .18**
** p<.01; * p<.05
Discussion
These results partially support the hypothesis that particular relational models will 
be conducive to experiencing particular moral emotions.  However, the associations are 
weak and the instruments used only allow inferences about overall frequencies of indi-
viduals’ use of the different relational models and their experiences of shame and guilt, 
rather than the tendency of a particular emotion to be evoked in a particular relational 
model.  Therefore a more specific approach is indicated.
Study 2
Hypotheses for Study 2 were the following:
1. In situations involving rejection anxiety (categorized as CS/divinity), shame will 
be the predominant self-blaming emotion, while expected emotions of others will in-
clude disgust or “shame for me,” but not anger.
2.  In situations that involve loss of status (categorized as AR/community), shame 
will be the predominant self-blaming emotion, while expected emotions of others will 
include contempt or “shame for me,” but not anger.
3.  In situations that involve harm to others or failure to meet responsibilities (cate-
gorized as EM + MP/autonomy), guilt will be the predominant self-blaming emotion, 
while expected emotions of others will include anger, but not disgust or contempt. 
It should be noted that most infractions can be expected to arouse several emotions 
in both the perpetrator and the victim or observer, but the hypotheses are concerned 
only with the moral emotions.  
Method
Participants. 489 respondents (313 females, 176 males), from three Turkish universi-
ties, with a mean age of 21.59 years, completed the questionnaires.
Instruments.  A Shame Measure was constructed, consisting of questions regarding 
8 vignettes depicting situations that had been determined in pretesting to reliably arouse 
shame. These situations included (1) Academic failure, (2) Neglecting a responsibili-
ty, (3) Revelation of lying, (4) Interpersonal harm, (5) Embarrassing public situations 
(“Trip and fall”), (6) Embarrassing public situations (“Insufficient funds”), (7) Sexuality 
(“Exposed body”) and (8) Sexuality (“Being exposed to sexual stimuli in the presence of 
others”).  Respondents rated the amount of shame they would expect to feel in each of 
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Hypothesis 3 was also supported.  The only vignettes in which respondents predicted 
they would feel “guilty” were those involving harm to others (lying, property damage, ir-
responsibility). In those situations they also expected the other to be “accusing” but not 
contemptuous or disgusted.   In line with the more common use of shame-related words 
in Turkish, respondents expected to feel “ashamed” in these situations as well as guilty.  
Respondents generally indicated close others such as parents or romantic partners as 
the observers.  As a consequence the expected reactions of others tended to be milder 
or more forgiving than predicted by the theory.  For example, rather than outright con-
tempt, the other was expected to feel “ashamed for me” or “pity” in the embarrassing 
situations.  However, these substitutions were in the predicted direction.
The studies reported here were carried out with samples drawn from members of 
a single culture – urban Turkish university students.  The results are, however, congru-
ent with the explicit claim of cross-cultural validity of relational models theory (Fiske, 
1992) and the implicit claim of cross-cultural validity of the CAD triad model (Rozin et 
al. 1999).  They are also congruent with the analysis of shame and guilt in three cultures 
by Fontaine, Luyten, De Boeck, et al. (2006), which showed that both the personal and 
the interpersonal structures of shame and guilt are similar across diverse cultures, de-
spite variation in specific triggers of different emotions, as predicted by, e.g., Markus & 
Kitayama (1991).  
Conclusion
In conclusion, the two studies provided strong support for (1) the relation of both 
self-blaming emotions and other-blaming emotions to relational models; and (2) the pre-
dicted complementary relation of self-blaming and other-blaming emotions, such that 
guilt and anger, shame of status loss and contempt, and shame of exclusion and disgust 
were seen as arising together in specific relational contexts.  They also provided indirect 
evidence for the connections between relational models theory and the moral codes at 
the basis of the CAD triad hypothesis.  
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Situation
Predicted Reactions 
to Self
Expected Reactions 
from OtherS
“Moral” transgressi-
ons
(EM / Autonomy)
Ashamed
Guilty 
Regretful
Accusing
Embarrassing public 
situations
(AR / Community)
Ashamed 
Angry Ashamed for me 
Pitying
Academic failure
(AR / Community)
Ashamed Ashamed for me 
Contempt
Exposed body
(CS / Divinity) Ashamed
Ashamed for me
Not affectionate
Sexual Stimuli
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Not affectionate
 (females)
Ashamed for me
(both males and fema-
les)
Note. Items that fit hypotheses are in italics. 
Discussion
Hypothesis 1 was fully supported.  Respondents chose “ashamed” as the only moral 
emotion that they thought they would feel in the two vignettes involving sexuality (un-
intentional exposure of body and exposure to sexual stimuli in the company of others), 
and in both vignettes female respondents chose “not affectionate” as one of the feelings 
of the other, showing that fear of rejection was aroused.  Both males and females ex-
pected the other to be “ashamed for me”, and females also expected the other to feel 
“disgusted” in the sexual stimuli vignette.  Anger was not included in the predictors.
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feel “ashamed for me”, “pitying” (in embarrassing situations) or “contemptuous” (in the 
case of academic failure).  Anger was chosen only in reference to the self, not the ob-
servers.  Thus the second hypothesis was also well supported.
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